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FIFTH AMENDMENT-DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS AT SENTENCING
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 106 S. Ct. 2411 (1986).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In McMillan v. Pennsylvania,I the Supreme Court held that Pennsylvania was not constitutionally required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt a fact 2 that would affect the length of the sentences the
defendants would receive upon conviction. In deciding this question, the Supreme Court upheld Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act. 3 That Act 4 provides that a person convicted
of certain enumerated felonies is subject to a mandatory minimum
sentence of five years imprisonment if the sentencing judge, when
considering the evidence, finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" during the
commission of the felony. The Pennsylvania court convicted each of
the defendants in McMillan of various felonies covered by the Act. 5
This Note examines judicial and academic constructions of the
due process clause of the fifth amendment in order to highlight the
due process issues presented in McMillan. This Note then examines
recent due process cases, finding that McMillan is part of a broader
effort on the part of the Supreme Court6 to limit the scope of its
decisions in In re Winship 7 and Mullaney v. Wilbur 8 and, consequently,
the applicability of the due process clause to the criminal law.
II. BACKGROUND
The fifth and fourteenth amendments state that no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. 9
1 106 S. Ct. 2411 (1986).
2 The fact to be proved in this case was visible possession of a firearm. McMillan,
106 S. Ct. at 2416.
3 Id. at 2414-20.
4 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982).
5 McMi~lan, 106 S. Ct. at 2414-15.
6 See infra notes 126-53 and accompanying text.
7 397 U.S. 358 (1970); see infra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
8 421 U.S. 684 (1975); see infra notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
9 The fifth amendment states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
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Thus, proceedings which threaten any of these interests must comply with certain procedures embodied in the term due process of
law. This potentially straightforward analysis has been complicated
in a number of ways.
The process that is due under the fifth amendment due process
clause differs with the type of proceeding involved.1 0 Certain requirements imposed on criminal trials by the Constitution may not
extend to other kinds of proceedings. Furthermore, the requirements of due process vary not only with the kind of proceeding but
also with the particular situation.II Accordingly, although "in many
respects [a state's capital sentencing hearing] resembles a trial on
the issue of guilt or innocence," [it] need not comply with the sixth
2
Simiand fourteenth amendments regarding jury requirements.'
larly, the juvenile justice system must follow some, but not all, of the
procedures prescribed by the due process clause.' 3 Finally, the eson a presentment or indictment of a GrandJury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. Section one of the fourteenth amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, cl. 1.
10 See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
11 "'[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.'" Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 200 (1982)(quoting Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
12 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1984).
13 The Supreme Court has made it clear that there is a constitutional distinction between a criminal trial and a juvenile proceeding:
We do not mean ... to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of
the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but
we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and
fair treatment.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967)(quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562
(1966)). The Supreme Court has held that juveniles may avail themselves of a number
of constitutional protections. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975)(holding that
double jeopardy protections apply to criminal proceedings subsequent to adjudicatory
hearings in juvenile courts); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that standard of
proof in delinquency hearings must meet the reasonable doubt standard which is a requirement of due process); In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967)(holding that delinquency hearings must guarantee such due process rights as timely notice, right to counsel, right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, and protection against self-incrimination); Kent
v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966)(holding that decision to transfer ajuvenile to adult
court is a critical phase of processing at which right to due process attaches). However,
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sentials of due process in the context of an agency rulemaking pro4
ceeding differ from those required in an adjudicatory context.'
There is also some indication that the three protected interests
(life, liberty and property) are not necessarily coequal. The Court
has characterized a citizen's liberty interest as "an interest of transcending value."' 15 This statement indicates that the due process
clause demands a great deal of procedural protection when a de6
fendant's liberty interest is at stake.'
In addition to the above distinctions, which are constitutionally
significant, the Supreme Court has considered a number of other
approaches in determining what process is due. The positivist position' 7 on procedural due process continues to receive the support of
some academics' s and members of the judiciary.' 9 The positivists
in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), the Court held that the due process
rights of juveniles charged with unlawful conduct do not include the right to trial by
jury. A number of recent decisions make it clear that the Court is withdrawing or declining to extend constitutional guarantees to those subject to the juvenile justice system.
See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985)(holding that school officials need not
seek a warrant and need not have probable cause to believe that any rule or law has been
violated in order to search students); Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984)(upholding
a provision of the New York Family Act that provides for the pre-trial detention of
juveniles if it were the opinion of the juvenile court that such juveniles would present a
risk to themselves or others were they not detained); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584
(1979)(upholding a Georgia statute which provides for the commitment ofjuveniles to
state mental hospitals without the requirement of any adversary hearing); Fare v.
Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979)(holding that fifth amendment protections against selfincrimination did not apply to a juvenile taken into police custody).
14 See Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908)("Many requirements essential
in strictly judicial proceedings may be dispensed with [in the administrative forum].").
15 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
16 In at least two dissenting opinions, Justice Stevens has stated his belief that qualitative differences exist between the three protected interests. See Spaziano v. Florida,
468 U.S. at 468 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("a deprivation of
liberty is qualitatively different from a deprivation of property"); Lassiter v. Department
of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 59-60 (1981)(Stevens, J., dissenting)(arguing that the
Court should not apply the Mathews v. Eldridge cost-benefit analysis when a person's liberty interest is at stake).
17 For a discussion of the positivist position in the due process context as compared
with the legal philosophy of positivism, see Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State,
72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1071 n.141 (1984).
18 Professor Easterbrook analyzes the historic antecedents of the due process clause,
the structure of the Constitution, and early due process cases and concludes that the
legislature's determination concerning what procedures are to be followed constitutes
due process of law. As a result, there is nothing for the judiciary to review. See Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 85. See also R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT
BYJUDICIARY 193-214 (1977). For an extensive critique of Easterbrook and the work of
the positivists, see Redish & Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Due Process,
95 YALE LJ. 455 (1986).
19 Based on his review of historical sources,Justice Black believed that due process of
law means law of the land. Therefore, any legislative enactment which does not offend
other sections of the Constitution meets the requirements of due process because it
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believe that due process of law mandates no more than compliance
with whatever procedures the legislature has mandated shall be followed. 20 Therefore, no basis exists for judicial review. 2 ' The Court
in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.2 2 considered and
rejected this reading of the due process clause. The Supreme Court
also rejected the positivists' reading of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment in Kennard v. Louisiana ex rel. Morgan23.
In Murray's Lessee, the Supreme Court used an historical test for
determining the procedures required by due process. 24 Thus, the
Court looked "to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statue [sic] law of England" 2 5 in order to
ascertain what process was due in that case.
The Court's due process approach has also contained the notion that the due process clause requires all procedures necessary to
secure a fair and just result. A number of cases 26 have held that the
proceeding in question must comply with the due process requirement of fundamental fairness.
Most recently, the Supreme Court has employed a balancing
test which weighs private and governmental interests in order to determine the process due in each case. The Court first used this aprepresents part of the law of the land. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 377-86 (Black, J.,
dissenting). ChiefJustice Rehnquist currently is the strongest supporter of this position
on the Court. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1503
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(the court "ought to recognize the totality of the State's
definition of the property right"); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974)(Rehnquist,J.,
writing for three Justice plurality)("[P]roperty interest which appellee had in his employment was itself conditioned by the procedural limitations which had accompanied the
grant of that interest.").
20 See Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 94-109.
21 See supra note 19; Redish & Marshall, supra note 18, at 457 n.12.
22 59 U.S. 272 (1855).
It is manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process which
might be devised. The [due process clause] is a restraint on the legislative as well as
on the executive and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave congress free to make any process "due process of law", by its
mere will.
Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 276.
23 92 U.S. 480 (1875)(The court implicitly acknowledged that the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment imposes normative limits on state procedure); see also Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877)(same).
24 Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 277.
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (1970) (due process embodies the notion of
"fundamental procedural fairness"); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116
(1934) ("due process of law requires that the proceedings shall be fair"); Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908)(in deciding whether states could compel self-incrimination in criminal cases, the Supreme Court questioned whether the freedom from selfincrimination was a "fundamental principle of liberty and justice").
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proach in 1976 in Mathews v. Eldridge.2 7 The test 28 is based on
considerations of economic efficiency and does not even mention
the idea of fairness.
As recent cases illustrate, tests favored by the Supreme Court in
the past have not been conclusively discarded nor are any of the
approaches described above mutually exclusive.2 9 Although the
positivist construction of due process was rejected by the Court long
ago, 30 Justice Black3 1 recently advocated this interpretative approach, and Justice Rehnquist 3 2 presently holds this view. Moreover, the Supreme Court has combined the historical and
fundamental fairness tests in its due process analysis. Stating that
due process contains the notion of "fundamental procedural fairness," 3 3 the Court has drawn its ideas of fairness in part from the
"historically grounded rights of our system" embodied in "the com27

424 U.S. 319 (1976).

28

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk

of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Redish and Marshall state their belief that the test was a response to "the burgeoning administrative state of the late 1960s" which "demonstrated
that the implementation of [all of the procedures mandated by due process in the adjudicatory context] across the board was not possible." Redish & Marshall, supra note 18,
at 471 (footnote omitted). The test has been criticized for leaving dignitary values out of
the balance. See Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process CalculusforAdministrativeAdjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHi. L. REV.
28, 51-52 (1976).
In reality the Mathews test and the positivist approach are often functionally
equivalent. Presumably, in enacting the legislation under review the legislature has already undertaken a cost-benefit analysis similar, if not identical to, the approach described in Mathews. Furthermore, it has done so while having within its possession
superior amounts of information and data concerning the likely effects upon individuals,
society, and the judicial system as a whole of various procedural schemes. Therefore, in
the absence of an obvious miscalculation or blatant disregard of relevant data, the Court
is likely to respect the legislature's decision.
29 See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text. Redish & Marshall's exposition of
the various due process tests is inaccurate to the extent that their article implies that past
tests have been conclusively discarded or that the Court currently regards these various
approaches as mutually exclusive.
30 See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855);
Kennard v. Louisiana ex rel. Morgan, 92 U.S. 480 (1875); see also supra notes 22 & 23 and
accompanying text.
31 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377-86 (1970)(Black, J., dissenting).
32 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1503 (1985)(Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
33 See Winship, 397 U.S. at 372.
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34

mon-law tradition."
Delivered in the midst of a complex and ever-changing due process analysis, McMillan v. Pennsylvania3 5 represents the Supreme
36
Court's response to three recent due process cases (In re Winship,
Mullaney v. Wilbur3 7 and Patterson v. New York38) that have shaped
due process analysis in recent years. In In re Winship, the Supreme
Court decided that the due process clause required proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in an adjudication to determine juvenile delinquency. 39 The Court's broad statement that due process required
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is charged" 40 was interpreted in the latter two cases. In Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme
Court determined that the reasonable doubt standard applied to all
factors that, if present, could affect the defendant's interests in liberty and reputation.4 1 Nonetheless, the Court subsequently decided
in Patterson v. New York that the rule of In re Winship applied only to
42
those factors defined by statute as elements of a crime.
III.

THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF

McMillan

Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act provides
that a person convicted of certain enumerated felonies is subject to
a mandatory minimum sentence of five years imprisonment if the
sentencing judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" during the commission of
the felony. 4 3 In McMillan the Pennsylvania court convicted the de34 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949).
35

36
37
38
39
40

106 S. Ct. 2411 (1986).
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
397 U.S. at 367.

Id. at 364.

41 421 U.S. at 696-701.

Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210.
§ 9712 (1982). Section 9712 provides in relevant part:
(a) Mandatory sentence-Any person who is convicted in any court of this Commonwealth of murder of the third degree, voluntary manslaughter, rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, robbery... aggravated assault.. . kidnapping, or
who is convicted of attempt to commit any of these crimes, shall, if the person visibly possessed a firearm during the commission of the offense, be sentenced to a
minimum sentence of at least five years of total confinement notwithstanding any
other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary.
(b) Proof at sentencing-Provisions of this section shall not be an element of the
crime.... The applicability of this section shall be determined at sentencing. The
court shall consider any evidence presented at trial and shall afford the Commonwealth and the defendant an opportunity to present any necessary additional evidence and shall determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, if this section is
applicable.
42

43 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
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fendants of various felonies covered by the Act. 44 Following the defendants' conviction, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania gave
notice that it would seek to proceed under the Act 4 5 at sentencing.
In each case, however, the sentencing judges found the Act unconstitutional and imposed lesser sentences than those required by the
statute.4 6 All four cases were appealed to the Supreme Court of
47
Pennsylvania, which consolidated the Commonwealth's appeals.
The appellees advanced two principal arguments. First, they contended that visible possession of a firearm was "an element of the
crimes for which they were being sentenced and thus must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt under In re Winship... and Mullaney v. Wilbur." 4 8 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that
the legislature had expressly stated that visible possession "shall not
be an element of the crime" 4 9 and that according to Pattersonv. New
York 50 the applicability of the reasonable doubt standard was a function of how the state defined the offense.
Appellees also asserted that even if visible possession is not an
element of the offense, due process still requires more than proof by
a preponderance of the evidence. 5 1 Rejecting the appellant's contention, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the Act did not
create a series of upgraded felonies of which visible possession was
an element because the Act became operative only after conviction
and served merely to limit the sentencing judge's discretion. 52 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the Act was consistent with
In re Winship, Mullaney and Patterson in that it did not create a presumption with respect to any fact constituting an element of the
crimes in question. 5 3 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found
that the state had a compelling interest in deterring the illegal use of
firearms and that the defendants' liberty interest had been substantially diminished by the guilty verdicts. 54 Therefore, the court held
(c) Authority of court in sentencing-There shall be no authority in any court to
impose on an offender to which this section is applicable any lesser sentence than
provided for in subsection (a) or to place such offender on probation or to suspend
sentence.
44 McMillan, 106 S. Ct. at 2414-15.
45 Id. at 2415.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. (quoting 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 9712(b)).
50 Id.
51 See McMillan, 106 S. Ct. at 2414.

Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
52
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that the preponderance standard satisfied due process. 55 The court
then vacated appellees' sentences and remanded for sentencing pursuant to the Act.5 6 The United States Supreme Court granted a writ
of certiorari and affirmed the opinion of the Supreme Court of
57
Pennsylvania.
IV.
A.

THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

THE PLURALITY OPINION

Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality of the Court, affirmed
and expanded the reasoning set forth by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. The Court stated that its holding was "controlled by
Patterson... rather than Mullaney"5 8 and found Pennsylvania's statute
to be constitutional since visible possession of a firearm was not an
element of the crimes for which the petitioners were convicted.5 9
The Court deferred to the states' preeminent interest in defining
and controlling crime. 60 The plurality relied on Patterson6 1 for the
proposition that there were constitutional limits beyond which the
states could not go in this regard. 62 Although the plurality concluded that Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act did
not exceed those limits, the Court declined to specifically define
them.65 Rather, the majority advanced as an example of unconstitutionality the Patterson Court's rather "unremarkable proposition that
the due process clause precludes states from discarding the presumption of innocence."' '
The Court observed that Pennsylvania's
statute did not create this type of presumption, nor did it in any way
"relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving guilt."' 65

The plurality distinguished its holding from Mullaney6 6 and
Specht v. Patterson6 7 on the basis of the difference between the Pennsylvania statute and the statutes at issue in those cases. The defendant in Mullaney, depending on the presence or absence of the
mitigating or aggravating factor at issue, faced "'a differential in
55 Id.
56 Id

57 a
d
58 Id at 2416.

59
60
61
62
63

Id at 2416-17.
See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
McMillan, 106 S. Ct. at 2417.

Id.
Id.

64 Id.
65 Id.

66 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
67 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
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sentencing ranging from a nominal fine to a mandatory life sentence.' "68 The defendants in McMillan, the Court observed, were
subjected to the same maximum length of incarceration regardless
of sentencing pursuant to the Act. 69 According to the majority,
Specht was similarly distinguishable. The Colorado statute in that
case was held to violate due process because it provided that a person convicted of a sexual offense, carrying a maximum penalty of
ten years imprisonment, could be exposed to an indefinite or life
sentence if a sentencing judge found that the defendant posed a
threat to society. 70 The majority also dismissed the petitioners' assertion "that had Winship already been decided at the time of Specht,
the Court would have also required that the burden of proof as to
7
the post-trial findings be beyond a reasonable doubt." '
In response to the petitioners' concern that states might
restructure their criminal codes to evade the rule of In re Winship,
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt for all elements of a
crime, the Court remarked that "[t]he Pennsylvania legislature did
not change the definition of any existing offense." 72 The Court also
observed that the fact that a number of the state legislatures have
made possession of a weapon an element of certain criminal offenses does not render Pennsylvania's approach to weapons posses73
sion unconstitutional.
The Court held that Pennsylvania could "treat 'visible possession of a firearm' as a sentencing consideration rather than an element of a particular offense." The Court concluded that the use of
the preponderance standard at sentencing satisfied due process
since "[s]entencing courts have traditionally heard evidence and
74
found facts without any prescribed burden of proof at all."
B.

DISSENTING OPINIONS

Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, dissented on the ground that the Court, and not the states, must decide
"[w]hether a particular fact is an element of a criminal offense." 75
Furthermore, according to In re Winship, these elements "must be
proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt." 76 Citing
68 McMillan, 106 S. Ct. at 2417.
69 McMillan, 106 S. Ct. at 2417-18
70 See McMillan, 106 S. Ct. at 2418

(quoting Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 700).
(citing Specht, 386 U.S. at 607).

71 McMillan, 106 S. Ct. at 2418.
72 Id. at 2418-19.
73 Id. at 2419.
74 Id. at 2420.
7-5 Id. at 2421 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
76 Id.
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Mullaney, 7 7 Justice Marshall stated that to hold otherwise would give

a state the opportunity to redefine which facts are elements of a
crime by allowing the state to "undermine many of the interests [In
re Winship] sought to protect. 7 8 Justice Marshall concluded his dissent by agreeing with Justice Stevens, who dissented separately, that
"'if a state provides that a specific component of a prohibited transaction shall give rise both to a special stigma and to a special punishment, that component must be treated as a "fact necessary to
constitute the crime" within the meaning of ... In re Winship.' "79
In his separate dissent, Justice Stevens analyzed Patterson and In
re Winship and reviewed the purposes behind the reasonable doubt
standard, showing that the majority incorrectly relied on Pennsylvania's definition of the elements of prohibited conduct. Beginning with a brief recitation of the facts, he noted that the trial
judges, as well as the superior court judges, who heard the appeals
"all concluded that visible possession of a firearm was an element of
the offense[s]" for which the defendants were being punished and
thus, required proof beyond a reasonable doubt.8 0 Justice Stevens
noted that while agreeing "that visible possession of a firearm is
conduct that the Pennsylvania General Assembly intended to prohibit," 8' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court nevertheless held that
this factor was not an element of the offenses. The court's holding
was grounded in its conclusion that the Pennsylvania General Assembly stated in the Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act that pro82
visions of that Act "shall not be an element of the crime."
Justice Stevens stated that the plurality, in affirming the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, improperly relied upon Patterson v. New
York to hold that Pennsylvania's definition of the offenses in question were dispositive for purposes of due process. He noted that
"nothing in Patterson or any of its predecessors authorizes a State to
decide for itself which of the ingredients of the prohibited transaction are 'elements' that it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial." 8 3 On the contrary, Justice Stevens stated that Pattersonmerely
permits a state, "subject ... to constitutional limits, to attach crimi-

nal penalties to a wide variety of objectionable transactions." 8 4
Drawing upon the Court's discussion of the interests protected
77 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
78 McMillan, 106 S. Ct. at 2421 (MarshallJ., dissenting).
79 Id. (quoting McMillan, 106 S. Ct. at 2426 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
80 Id. at 2422 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81 Id.
82
83
84

Id. (quoting PA.
Id. at 2423.
Id.

CONS. STAT.

9712 (b)).
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by the reasonable doubt standard in In re Winship, Justice Stevens
concluded that the applicability of the due process clause depends
upon whether individuals engaged in a course of conduct are subject to "criminal penalties" which give "rise to both a special stigma
and a special punishment. ' 85 Furthermore, "[a]s [the Court] held
in Mullaney, '[t]he safeguards of due process are not rendered unavailable simply because a determination may already have been
reached that would stigmatize the defendant and that might lead to
a significant impairment of personal liberty.' "86 Since, under the
statute, visible possession of a firearm subjects a defendant to a
longer sentence than the trial judge would otherwise have imposed,
thereby leading to increased stigmatization and punishment, proof
87
of that factor should be required beyond a reasonable doubt.
Justice Stevens concluded his dissent with a discussion of aggravating and mitigating facts and the methods by which a state may
criminalize certain types of conduct. 8 8 Justice Stevens hypothesized
a number of statutes which would criminalize seemingly innocent
forms of conduct and allow a number of affirmative defenses. 89 The
due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt would
not apply to proof of the affirmative defenses, because the interests
protected by the due process clause are safeguarded by "the continued functioning of the democratic process." 90 Such legislation
would never "command a majority of the electorate." 9 1
Justice Stevens stated, however, that "[i]t is not at all inconceivable.., to fear that a State might subject those individuals convicted
of engaging in antisocial conduct to further punishment for aggravating conduct not proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 92 By impinging upon the individual's "interest in avoiding both the loss of
liberty and the stigma that results from a criminal conviction," the
presence of these aggravating factors must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 9 3 Accordingly, Justice Stevens found that proof of
visible possession of a firearm under Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act must meet the reasonable doubt standard of
due process.
Id. at 2422.
86 Id. at 2424 n.3.
87 Id. at 2426.
88 Id. at 2424-26.
89 Id. at 2424-25.
90 Id. at 2424.
91 Id. at 2425.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 2425-26.
85

1986]

DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AT SENTENCING
V.

657

ANALYSIS

Although the range and complexity of due process analysis
served to guide the Court in its decisionmaking, the Supreme Court
decided McMillan v. Pennsylvania94 within the analytical framework
provided by a trio 9 5 of recent due process cases. Taken together,
these cases illustrate the Supreme Court's changing attitude toward
fifth amendment criminal law analysis. During the Warren Court,
the Supreme Court extended the application of the due process
clause to various components of the criminal justice system. 96 In re
Winship's 9 7 formal constitutionalization of the standard of proof
used in criminal proceedings represented a continuation of this
trend. The Supreme Court's decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur 98 represents the furthest extension of due process protections within the
criminal context. In Mullaney the Court indicated that a state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the crime, including all factors which, if proven, would have an effect upon the defendant's interests in liberty and reputation. 9 9 Fearful of the effects
on the use of presumptions and affirmative defenses, the possibilities for legislative reform and the criminal justice system as a whole,
the Supreme Court upheld a state statute in Patterson v. New York. 0 0
The statute involved in that case required the defendant to prove
the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance by a preponderance of the evidence in order to reduce second-degree murder to manslaughter. The Patterson Court also presented a
revisionist history of Mullaney in an attempt to limit some of the implications arising from this earlier decision. 10 '
Like Patterson,McMillan represents a continuation of the Court's
movement away from Mullaney and the interpretation of In re Winship
that Mullaney presented. McMillan reflects the Supreme Court's efforts to prevent the application of the due process clause, and consequently the reasonable doubt standard, to all aspects of the
94 106 S. Ct. 2411 (1986).
95 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684
(1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
96 See, e.g., Thomas & Bilchik, ProsecutingJuvenilesin CriminalCourts: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 76 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 439, 453 (1985). For cases illustrating the
application of due process to the juvenile justice system, see Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S.
519 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); see also supra note 13.
97 397 U.S. 358 (1970); see also infra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.

98 421 U.S. 684 (1975).

99 Id. at 697-706; see also infra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
100 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
101 Id. at 214-16; see also infra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
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criminal law. An analysis of the significance of McMillan requires
close consideration of those three earlier cases.
In In re Winship, the Supreme Court determined the burden of
proof constitutionally required in an adjudication determining juvenile delinquency.' 0 2 In deciding In re Winship, the Court relied on In
re Gault,l0 3 a juvenile delinquency case decided three years earlier.
In In re Gault, the Court stated that although the requirements imposed by the fourteenth amendment vary depending on the type of
proceeding involved, the due process clause requires that an adjudicatory hearing to determine juvenile delinquency must comport
with " 'the essentials of due process and fair treatment.' 104 The
Court, in In re Winship, held that the reasonable doubt standard of
proof was one of the essentials of due process. The Court stated its
holding in broad terms:
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of
the reasonable doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the due process
clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of0 every
fact necessary to constitute the crime
5
with which he is charged.'
In one respect, In re Winship was a rather unremarkable decision. In
granting constitutional protection to the reasonable doubt standard,
In re Winship merely confirmed the existing state of affairs regarding
the degree of proof required in criminal cases.' 0 6 At the same time,
however, the language used and the circumstances of the case indicate a more general holding. In re Winship dealt specifically with the
burden of proof required in ajuvenile delinquency hearing. Yet the
Supreme Court presented its decision in the form of a rule that was
not limited to the facts of that case. Furthermore, the Court in Winship applied a rule used within the context of a criminal trial to a
juvenile delinquency proceeding. As a result, such words as "conviction," "fact," and "crime" were left open to creative definition.
There are two major interpretations 10 7 of the Supreme Court's
397 U.S. 358, 359 (1970).
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
104 Id. at 30 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966)).
105 Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
106 The Court described the historical prevalence of the reasonable doubt standard in
criminal trials and cited many of its earlier opinions where it had assumed that this burden of proof was constitutionally mandated with respect to a criminal charge. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 361-64. See also id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("It is only because of
the nearly complete and long-standing acceptance of the reasonable-doubt standard by
the States in criminal trials that the Court has not before today had to hold explicitly that
102

103

due process .. .requires [this] standard.").
107 For a discussion and critique of the procedural interpretation and the formalist
interpretation of In re Winship, see Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of

19861

DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AT SENTENCING

659

holding in In re Winship. The procedural interpretation1 0 8 views In re
Winship as requiring a state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
presence or absence of every factor, including the definitional elements of the offense, having an impact on penal liability. The formalistic interpretation 0 9 of In re Winship requires a state to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt only those elements included in the
state's definition of the offense. 110 The Supreme Court's decisions
in Mullaney II I and Patterson112 help to clarify the parameters of the
holding in In re Winship.
In Mullaney, the Supreme Court of the United States held unconstitutional a Maine homicide statute" 3 that placed upon the defendant the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that he acted "in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation" in
order to secure a manslaughter conviction."14 The Court accepted
the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's construction that under the law
of Maine murder and manslaughter are not distinct crimes, but
rather, different degrees of the single generic offense of felonious
Proofin the CriminalLaw, 88 YALE LJ. 1325, 1328-38 (1979). In addition to acknowledging the two above-mentioned theories, Professor Allen also presents the political compromise and proportionality interpretations of In re Winship. See Allen, The Restoration of
In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasionin CriminalCases After Patterson v. New
York, 76 MICH. L. REV. 30, 46-53 (1977). Allen presents these two approaches by way of
a discussion of Pattersonv. New York, a case which he sees as "restor[ing] Winship to its
original purpose." Id. at 37. The political compromise theory would permit placing the
burden of persuasion on the defendant when the legislature would have refused to
adopt the defense except for the fact that the burden of proof has been placed on the
defendant. The proportionality theory states that there must be proportionality between the maximum punishment authorized by statute for the commission of the offense
and the seriousness of the offense. The eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment provides the constitutional basis for the proportionality principle. See id. at 46-53. This Note declines to classify as 'major' these two interpretations
because of the absence of language in In re Winship, Patterson or Mullaney which would
indicate that the Court had adopted either of these approaches. Professor Allen himself
admits that the PattersonCourt neither mentions the eighth amendment nor the proportionality doctrine. See id at 53.
108 See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 107, at 1333-38.
109 SeeJeffries & Stephan, supra note 107, at 1328-33.
110 See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 107.
III See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
112 See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
113 The Maine murder statute, ME. REv. STAT. ANN., Tit. 17, § 2651 (1964), provided:

"Whoever unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought, either express or
implied, is guilty of murder and shall be punished by imprisonment for life." The Maine
manslaughter statute, ME. REV. STAT. ANN., Tit. 17, § 2551 (1964), in relevant part pro-

vides: "Whoever unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation, without express or implied malice aforethought.., shall be punished by a fine
of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 20 years ......
114 Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 704.
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homicide. 1 5 Advancing a formalist interpretation of the holding in
In re Winship, the State of Maine asserted that absence of "heat of
passion, on sudden provocation," ' 1 6 is not a fact necessary to constitute the crime of felonious homicide and, therefore, need not be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt in accordance with the holding
in In re Winship. 1 7 Viewing the issue "in terms of the potential differences in the restrictions of personal liberty attendant to each conviction," 1 8 the Supreme Court demolished the formalistic view 119
of In re Winship:
[I]f Winship were limited to those facts that constitute a crime as defined by state law, a State could undermine many of the interests that
decision sought to protect without effecting any substantive change in
its law. It would only be necessary to redefine the elements that constitute different crimes, characterizing
them as factors that bear solely
12 0
on the extent of punishment.
Looking at "substance" over "form" with respect to Maine's statutory scheme, the Court rested its decision on the fact that the presence or absence of sudden provocation affected the degree of
criminal culpability' 2 ' and, consequently, the defendant's interests
22
in liberty and reputation.'
Mullaney's requirement that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt the presence or absence of all factors affecting penal liability, promised to revolutionize the criminal justice system. The
Court's procedural approach to due process in Mullaney threatened
to strip American criminal law of its sophistication by prohibiting
the use of all presumptions and affirmative defenses. 12 3 Rather than
bear the burden of proving the absence of these mitigating circumstances, the states would probably return to a set of offenses without
grade or differentiation.' 24 As a result, state criminal codes would
become more severe. 12 5 Ironically, in attempting to afford the de115 Id. at 691-92.
116 ME. REV. STAT. ANN.,
117 421 U.S. at 697.
118 Id. at 698.

Tit. 17, § 2551 (1964).

119 See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
120 421 U.S. at 698.
121 In Maine a finding that the defendant committed murder leads to life imprisonment, a manslaughter finding leads to a maximum 20 year sentence and maximum possible fine of $1,000. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN., Tit. 17, §§ 2551, 2651 (1964).
122 Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 696-701.
123 The academic and judicial response to Mullaney v. Wilbur ranged from a belief that
Mullaney disallowed all affirmative defenses to a belief that that decision may be safely
confined to its facts. SeeJeffries & Stephan, supra note 107 at 1340-41 and accompanying
footnotes.
124 See id. at 1353-56.
125 See id.
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fendant the most procedural protection possible, the Supreme
Court in Mullaney rendered a decision which promised to serve
poorly the interests of future defendants.
In Patterson,126 the Supreme Court moved to limit the scope of
its decision in Mullaney and to stop what it regarded as the overconstitutionalization of the criminal process. 12 7 The decision also reflected the Court's concern with the administrative costs associated
with the requirements of due process. 128 The Patterson Court upheld a New York statute' 29 requiring a defendant charged with second-degree murder to prove extreme emotional disturbance by a
preponderance of the evidence in order to be convicted of manslaughter. 130 The Court distinguished Mullaney on the ground that
sudden provocation and malice aforethought were mutually exclusive.13 1 Consequently, Maine's requirement that the defendant
bear the burden of proving the former by a preponderance of the
evidence was the same as requiring the defendant to prove the absence of the latter. Therefore, according to the Patterson Court, the
statute in Mullaney was declared unconstitutional because its presumption concerning a mitigating factor was, in effect, a presumption concerning an element of the crime.' 3 2 The Court stated that,
on the contrary, the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance "does not serve to negative any facts of the crime which
133
the State is to prove in order to convict of murder."'
Having presented a revisionist history of its holding in Mullaney,
126 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
127 See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 214-15 n.15. Justice Rehnquist's concurrence provides

the only indication that the Court in Mullaney was concerned with the impact of its holding upon the use of affirmative defenses. Justice Rehnquist stated his belief that the
holding in Mullaney did not overrule the Court's decision in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S.
790 (1952), which sustained a requirement that the defendant bear the burden of proving insanity. See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 705-06.
128 See infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
129 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1975) provides in relevant part:
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when: 1. With"intent to cause the
death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person;
except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense
that: (a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20(2) (McKinney 1975) provides in relevant part:
A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: ....2. With intent to
cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third
person under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he acts under
the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 125.25. ...
130 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201.
131 Id at 213, 215-16.
132 Id. at 215-16.
133 Id at 207.
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which allowed the Court to avoid overruling that case, the Supreme
Court proceeded in Patterson to adopt a formalist approach1 3 4 to the
due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Court stated that "the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in
the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged."' 1 5
Acknowledging the possibility that states would exploit the decision
by reclassifying as affirmative defenses some elements of the crime
in question, the Court stated that there were "constitutional limits
36
beyond which the States may not go in this regard."'
A number of concerns motivated the Court in Patterson. The
Court knew that Mullaney, taken to its logical conclusion, would have
the effect of abolishing all affirmative defenses, including the
twenty-five affirmative defenses contained in New York's criminal
code.' 3 7 Consequently, the Supreme Court stated that the "Due
Process Clause ...

does not put New York to the choice of aban-

doning those defenses or undertaking to disprove their existence in
order to convict of a crime .. ."138
The Supreme Court was also concerned with economic efficiency and the administrative costs associated with the requirements
of due process.' 3 9 The Court acknowledged Justice Harlan's statement in In re Winship that the reasonable doubt standard is based on
a fundamental value determination that it is worse to convict an innocent person than let a guilty one go free. 140 However, " [D]ue process does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at
whatever cost, to eliminate [this] possibility."'14 1 Without mentioning Mathews v. Eldridge142 by name, the Supreme Court nevertheless
adopted a balancing approach roughly similar to the one presented
143
in that case.

134 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
135 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210 (emphasis added).
136

Id.

137 See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 207, 211 n.13; see also supra notes 116-18.

Patterson, 432 U.S. at 207-08.
The Supreme Court's concern with economic efficiency was manifested in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), an administrative law case which the Court decided one year before Patterson. See supra notes 27 & 28 and accompanying text.
140 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 208 (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
141 Id. (emphasis added).
142 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
138
139

143

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
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To recognize at all a mitigating circumstance does not require the
State to prove its nonexistence in each case in which the fact is put in
this would be too cumbersome, too expensive,
issue, if in its judgment
14 4
and too inaccurate.
In constructing its criminal code, the state legislature must weigh
the costs associated with the placement of these burdens upon the
state against the magnitude of the individual interests at stake.
The Supreme Court may have omitted mentioning Mathews for
a number of reasons. The Mathews decision concerned an administrative procedure and, therefore, may be of limited applicability to
the criminal law. The Court also may have been dissuaded from
employing a strictly economic approach in determining what process is due in criminal cases because of the transcendent value
placed upon life and liberty. A cost/benefit analysis would serve
only to denigrate those interests.
Following the formalist approach laid down in Patterson,'4 5 the
Supreme Court in McMillan declined to hold that due process required the use of the reasonable doubt standard of proof with regard to the issue of visible possession of a firearm. 14 6 The Court
rested its decision on the fact that "the Pennsylvania legislature has
expressly provided that visible possession of a firearm is not an element of the crimes enumerated in the mandatory sentencing
statute."

14 7

Although it dismissed Mullaney in favor of its "most recent pronouncement on this subject"14 8 - Pattersonv. New York - the majority nonetheless applied the interests analysis of Mullaney in its
opinion. Depending on the presence or absence of the factor at issue in Mullaney, the defendant in that case faced "'a differential in
sentencing ranging from a nominal fine to a mandatory life sentence,'"149 whereas, the defendants in McMillan, the Court explained, were subjected to the same maximum lengths of
incarceration with or without being sentenced pursuant to the
Act.' 50 Thus, without actually using the language of Mullaney, the
Court implied that the Act was acceptable under due process because it does not compel the defendants to forfeit their liberty interadministrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
Id. at 335.
144 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 209 (footnote omitted).
145 See McMillan, 106 S. Ct. at 2416-17.
146 Id. at 2419.

147 Id. at 2416.
148 Id.

149 Id. at 2417 (quoting Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 700).
150 Id. at 2417-18.
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est to any greater degree than that which had already occurred upon
conviction.
The Court had applied this approach to the facts within its earlier decision in Specht v. Patterson.'5 ' According to the majority,
Specht was similarly distinguishable because the Colorado statute
which was held to violate due process in that case stated that a person convicted of a sexual offense, otherwise carrying a maximum
penalty of ten years imprisonment, would be exposed to an indefinite or a possible life sentence if the sentencing judge found that the
defendant posed a threat to society.1 52 The Court's subtle use of
the interests test of Mullaney helps explain justice Rehnquist's rather
sudden concession to Mullaney contained in his statement that "in
certain limited circumstances Winship's reasonable doubt requirement applies to facts not formally identified as elements of the offense charged." 15 3 The Court thus left open the possibility of
applying the reasonable doubt standard to factors not included in
the state's definition of the offense. In justifying its conclusion
under both Mullaney and Patterson, the Court made its decision virtually unassailable.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court rendered its decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania against the background of a complex and ever-changing due
process analysis. 154 The requirements of due process vary depending on the type of proceeding involved.' 5 5 Furthermore, the three
protected interests, life, liberty and property, are not necessarily
equal.15 6 Finally, the Supreme Court has employed various methods to determine what process is due. These methods have ranged
from an application of procedures in existence at the time of the
American Revolution, to those procedures deemed to be "fair," to a
test which balances the relative burdens a given procedurewould
57
place upon the state or individual.
The Court decided McMillan more narrowly within the conceptual framework provided by three recent due process cases. The
Court in In re Winship stated that every fact which is an element of
386 U.S. 605 (1967).
See McMillan, 106 S. Ct. at 2418; see also Specht, 386 U.S. at 607.
McMillan, 106 S. Ct. at 2417.
See notes 9-38 and accompanying text.
See notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
156 See notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
157 See notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
151
152
153
154
155
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the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.158 The Court
later handed down two cases' 59 which presented two different interpretations of the In re Winship decision. Mullaney 160 adopted the
proceduralist view, holding that all factors having an impact on the
defendant's liberty or reputational interests must be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. Adopting a formalist approach, the Supreme
Court in Patterson161 later stated that due process required proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all elements included in the definition of
16 2
an offense.
The McMillan Court adopted the concerns of Patterson and enforced that decision. Such concerns included the fear that the application of the due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of all factors having an effect on the defendant's interests in
liberty and reputation would cause the state to remove from its laws
all such mitigating or aggravating factors.' 63 The Court also
showed concern about economic efficiency and the need to weigh
164
the burdens upon the state to prove a mitigating circumstance.
McMillan v. Pennsylvania is thus part of the Burger Court's broad effort to limit the applicability of the due process requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the criminal context.
ANTHONY

158

J. DENNIS

See also note 99 and accompanying text.

159 Muflaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S 197

(1977).
160
161
162
163
164

421 U.S. 684 (1975).
432 U.S. 197 (1977).
Id. at 210; see also note 137 and accompanying text.
See notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
See notes 139-43 and accompanying text.

